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The Rehabilitation Process in Czechoslovakia: Party and Popular Responses 
 
Kevin McDermott and Klára Pinerová 
 
 
The release and rehabilitation of political prisoners in Czechoslovakia occurred in a staggered and 
long drawn-out process beginning in the mid-1950s and culminating only after the collapse of the 
communist state in 1989-90. Following Stalin’s death and the first tentative steps towards de-
Stalinisation in the USSR, a few high-ranking Czechoslovak communist prisoners were released and 
several official party commissions were established to examine the trials and purges of the years 
1948-54, but only the last, operating in the liberalised atmosphere of 1968, gave a reasonably 
comprehensive and accurate account of Stalinist repression. Following the crushing of the Prague 
Spring reforms in 1968, rehabilitation became a victim of the pro-Soviet ‘normalisation’ regime. In 
addition to the party reviews, general amnesties were passed in 1953, 1955, 1957, 1960, 1962 and 
1965, the main one of which was the 9 May 1960 presidential decree which freed, albeit conditionally, 
over 5,000 political prisoners. Our chapter, which is based primarily on materials in the Communist 
Party and Security Services archives, has two broad aims. First, to analyse how and why the 
Czechoslovak party leaders sought to limit and control the challenges of de-Stalinisation and political 
rehabilitation via party commissions and amnesties; and second, to explore a crucial issue which has 
been largely overlooked in existing historiography - the reaction of the party rank-and-file membership 
and citizenry to the release of political internees, the attitudes of the returnees themselves and the 
implications of these responses for state-society relations. To what extent was party discipline 
undermined by the revelations of Stalinist crimes? How far did the reactions of ‘ordinary’ citizens and 
the returnees pose a threat to the regime? What were the repercussions of rehabilitation for the 
fraught Czech-Slovak relationship? Or, conversely, is there evidence that Czechs and Slovaks were 
broadly supportive of the amnesties? Was the state-society nexus in any way strengthened by the 




The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunistická strana Československa - KSČ) seized power 
in a bloodless semi-constitutional coup in late February 1948. Thereafter, the immediate political goal 
for the communists was to consolidate and extend their monopoly of power and state-sponsored 
terror was a prime method in this quest. In the following months and years, persecution affected all 
classes and strata of society: communists, non-communists and anti-communists, Czechs and 
Slovaks, young and old, men and women, blue and white-collar workers, farmers, intellectuals, 
students, religious orders and the military. Numerically, it is still impossible to arrive at precise overall 
figures of victims as the term ‘repression’ covers a wide variety of meanings and measures: non-
judicial murder, judicial execution, detention in labour camps or prison, enforced military service, 
expulsion from the party, loss of employment and status, and a host of other social and material 
restrictions including evictions from dwellings, exclusions from schools and universities, arbitrary 
reduction or cessation of pension payments and confiscation of personal property. Regardless of 
these perennial uncertainties, archival findings indicate that just under 90,000 citizens were 
prosecuted for ‘political crimes’ in the years 1948-54, over 22,000 were incarcerated in 107 labour 
camps or 'units' (pracovní útvary), around 60,000 suspect soldiers, conscripts and others were 
condemned to back-breaking work in special construction battalions, and as many as 1,157 people 
perished in detention.1  
    It is also widely agreed that between October 1948 and December 1952, 233 death penalties were 
pronounced, of which 178 were carried out. More death penalties were approved in 1953 and 1954, a 
total of 181 being passed between 1953 and 1960, although this number includes 'ordinary' criminals. 
Tens of others were shot while trying to escape from prison or attempting to flee the borders. Among 
the communist elite, 278 high-ranking party functionaries were convicted, but it must be noted that 
communist victims represented a tiny fraction of the total sentenced (some have estimated a mere 0.1 
per cent). The most notorious show trial was that of the former KSČ General Secretary, Rudolf 
Slánský, and thirteen co-defendants most of whom were Jewish. Eleven were sentenced to death and 
three received life in prison. In addition, purges and expulsions reduced the size of the party by 
several hundred thousand in the years 1949-54.2  
    The legacy of Stalinist terror in Czechoslovakia was far-reaching. At a very profound level, the 
political trials ‘were a manifestation of inhumanity that shook socialism to its foundations both in 
Czechoslovakia and abroad. The effects were felt in all areas: economic, political and cultural, in the 
minds of the people, in relations between citizens and in the country’s international standing.’3 To take 
just one example: in political and everyday life, the numerous violations of the law and the constant 
search for the ‘enemy within’ bred mistrust and suspicion, engendered widespread feelings of fear 
and legal insecurity in the population, and undermined public faith in the constitution and politics in 
general. In many ways, then, the persecutions and purges of the period 1948-54 lay at the root of the 
social crises that culminated in the Prague Spring of 1968. But even the cataclysmic and painful re-
evaluations of the past associated with Alexander Dubček’s ‘socialism with a human face’ did not 
adequately fulfil the demands for rehabilitation and justice on the part of the unjustly condemned. 
Indeed, the wounds are still apparent to this day, an ugly and unwanted reminder of a dark past which 
implicated and tainted too many people. 
 
The Party Elite and Rehabilitation  
The complex rehabilitation process in communist Czechoslovakia unfolded in three interlinked 
phases. The initial phase occurred in the mid-1950s following Stalin’s death in March 1953. The KSČ 
belatedly responded to this cataclysmic event by establishing a party commission to review the cases 
against leading communists. This investigation was boosted by Nikita Khrushchev’s famous ‘secret 
speech’ in February 1956 at the 20th congress of the Soviet party in which he audaciously attacked 
Stalin’s ‘cult of personality’. The second phase began in the early 1960s after Khrushchev’s renewed 
‘de-Stalinisation’ drive in 1961-62 and culminated in two other inconclusive party revisions of the 
trials. The final and most dramatic phase is closely associated with the reforms of the Prague Spring, 
which were curtailed by the Warsaw Pact invasion of August 1968. These official party reviews were 
punctuated by a series of presidential amnesties which cumulatively saw the release of many 
thousands of people, ‘ordinary’ criminals as well as communist and non-communist political prisoners. 
We will discuss these three waves of rehabilitation before assessing popular reactions to the 
liberation and return of Stalinist victims.  
    Stalin’s demise and Khrushchev’s sensational ‘secret speech’ ushered in an uneven rehabilitation 
process in the USSR and across communist Eastern Europe. It is fair to say that the Czechoslovak 
party was not at the forefront of these momentous revisions. The main reason for this stubborn 
recalcitrance was the fact that the incumbent leaders in the mid-1950s - men such as party boss 
Antonín Novotný, President Antonín Zápotocký, Prime Minister Viliam Široký and Slovak party leader 
Karol Bacílek - were intimately connected with the Stalinist repressions. They were fully cognisant of 
the illegal methods used by the security services to extract confessions from the accused and, thus, 
were fearful that their own positions, and that of the regime as a whole, would be seriously threatened 
by unearthing the crimes of the recent past. Nevertheless, under pressure from Moscow and events in 
neighbouring Hungary and Poland and in response to internal complaints and demands for redress, 
they reluctantly decided to inaugurate a partial review of the trials and to release a number of 
prisoners, initially several fairly high-ranking communist victims. The first concrete step in this process 
was the presidential amnesty of 4 May 1953, under the terms of which 13,674 persons were 
pardoned and released from prison, most of whom were judicially convicted criminals. This 
substantially reduced the total number of prisoners, from 46,021 in 1953 to 31,840 in 1954.4 
    The 1953 amnesty was followed by the establishment on 10 January 1955 of the first of the party 
committees into the political trials, euphemistically known in official parlance as ‘distortions of socialist 
legality’. The commission took the name of its chair, Rudolf Barák, the Minister of the Interior. 
According to Novotný, its specific and strictly limited task was to examine ‘some of the post-1948 
court cases with reference to the sentences’ of certain leading communists: the mass repression of 
non-communists was expressly excluded from its purview, as was, at first, the incendiary Slánský trial. 
Hence, the Barák Commission, which operated until autumn 1957, was ‘not concerned with 
rehabilitation, or with endeavouring….to probe the violations of the law and their causes; [their] chief 
consideration was to salve the conscience of the Politburo by putting a political full stop to the 
matter.’5 Given the immense sensitivity of the issue, the whole undertaking was carried out in camera, 
perpetuating the custom of working behind closed doors, and even eminent party functionaries, let 
alone the Czechoslovak public, were unaware of the commission’s existence. The main problem was 
that the inquiry remained at all times under the tight political subordination of the Stalinised KSČ 
Politburo and all results were subject to its approval. Neither did the composition of the commission 
inspire confidence - the majority of members, including Barák, were heavily involved in the 
depredations of the Stalinist era. 
    For all these reasons the commission’s reports and recommendations were tentative in the 
extreme. Of the 300 cases examined, only in fifty two were the original sentences reduced. In 
addition, in 1955 and 1956 a few individuals were conditionally released for good behaviour, the most 
noteworthy being Artur London and Vavro Hajdů, who were defendants in the Slánský trial, and Josef 
Smrkovský, who was to play a highly influential role in the Prague Spring. However, these fortunates 
were not politically or socially rehabilitated.6 Other prominent victims like Gustáv Husák, a leading 
Slovak communist tried and sentenced in 1954, and Evžen Löbl, another of the Slánský 
‘conspirators’, were left languishing in jail until 1960. Rather than implicate the current party leaders in 
the illegalities, the Barák Commission transferred the blame to the State Security apparatus. 
Notoriously thuggish investigators, such as Bohumil Doubek and Vladimír Kohoutek, were arrested, 
though given very lenient sentences and soon reprieved. Crucially, Slánský was construed as the 
‘Czechoslovak Beria’, Stalin’s secret police henchman, and held accountable for creating the entire 
security machine that had mushroomed out of control in the early 1950s. In this crass manner, the 
party executives attempted to reassign responsibility for the lawlessness and wash their hands of the 
matter.  
    Partial revision and official obfuscation, however, could not erase the history of the political purges 
from public consciousness. It was a veritable Pandora’s box which party leaders ignored at their peril. 
In the mid-to-late 1950s more and more people sentenced in the show trials demanded a re-
examination of their cases as the first step to full judicial and party rehabilitation.7 Many lower-level 
KSČ activists and rank-and-file members also pushed for meaningful explanations and actions from 
their superiors. This up-swell of disquiet ‘from below’ placed the party elite in a profound quandary 
and as a preventive measure they decided to resort to amnesties as the preferred method of redress. 
For the victims this represented a compromise ‘solution’, because although they may be released 
under the terms of any amnesty, they were not legally exonerated of their ‘crimes’. Amnesty definitely 
did not equal rehabilitation, and this was precisely its attraction for the party leadership. Hence, the 
election of Novotný as the new President of the republic served as the occasion for the November 
1957 amnesty as a result of which 4,811 people, mainly ‘ordinary’ criminals, were released from 
prison.8 This was followed by a more expansive presidential amnesty on 9 May 1960, which was 
announced as part of the celebrations of the fifteenth anniversary of the country’s liberation by the 
Red Army and as a marker of the ‘triumph of socialism’ in Czechoslovakia. This amnesty was 
particularly important for political prisoners.  
     Pressure for action did not just come from within. Novotný may have been able to partly 
circumvent domestic opinion and the accumulation of new evidence about the ‘inconsistencies’ of the 
Barák Commissions, but he found it harder to ignore Moscow. Khrushchev’s renewed drive to expose 
the excesses of Stalinism at the 22nd party congress in October 1961 placed the Czechoslovak 
leaders in yet another dilemma. Despite initial prevarication and insistence on the guilt of most of the 
leading communist victims, Novotný was eventually compelled to return to the explosive issue of the 
Stalinist trials and repressions. In September 1962, the Kolder Commission, named after its chair 
Presidium member Drahomír Kolder, was established. Its task was to reinvestigate the main trials of 
1948-54 and to make ‘recommendations’ to the party’s Central Committee. This time, importantly, the 
Slánský case was to be reviewed, but again, as in the Barák Commission, revision of the trials of non-
communists was omitted from Kolder’s brief. His report and recommendations, ratified by the 
Presidium in April 1963, were more forthright and far-reaching than those of 1955-57, no doubt 
reflecting the perceived need for accelerated ‘de-Stalinisation’ and indicative of Novotný’s relatively 
secure power position having removed his prime rival, Barák, from the leadership the previous year.  
    Thus, Kolder’s report ‘described the main trials as fabrications and completed the judicial 
rehabilitation of all the condemned’, Slánský included.9 These individuals, if alive, were to be 
compensated for the harm suffered and party, police and judicial officials involved in the illegalities 
were subject to party penalties and punishment. In the event, by 1964 this affected 47 persons in 
State Security and 58 in the Ministry of the Interior. Breaches of ‘socialist legality’ were blamed on 
Gottwald and other party leaders, a few of whom were forced to leave their positions to be replaced 
by younger reform-oriented and less dogmatic politicians, such as Dubček, who succeeded the 
Stalinist Bacílek as Slovak party boss. Moreover, between April 1963 and the end of 1967, over 380 
members were reinstated in the party and all received financial compensation and reasonable 
accommodation. However, regardless of these hopeful signs the Kolder Commission’s report, which 
was not revealed to the public, still left many stones unturned. Full party rehabilitation was not 
extended to Slánský and five other prominent trial victims, whose expulsion from the party was 
reconfirmed. They were still treated as guilty of serious political and ideological ‘crimes’. Those 
released and exonerated were not permitted to take up responsible posts and many remained 
uncompensated and deeply resentful. Neither did the report point any fingers at Novotný for his role in 
the repressions, which is hardly surprising given his personal interventions in the Commission’s 
activities.10  
    Specific conditions existed in Slovakia. The strained relations between Czechs and Slovaks, going 
back to the interwar First Republic, the Munich agreement and wartime territorial division, had their 
corollary in the KSČ. Novotný was well known for his less than positive attitude towards Slovakia and 
for many Slovaks, communists included, his personal stance epitomised a more general Czech 
condescension and arrogance. Nationalist sentiment was further exacerbated by the asymmetrical 
power arrangements in the state which Slovaks justifiably regarded as ‘Pragocentric’ and overly 
centralised. These embedded tensions and conflicts were made potentially dangerous by the trial and 
conviction of several leading Slovak communists in April 1954 on the spurious, ideologically loaded 
and inflammatory charge of ‘bourgeois nationalism’. Husák, a trained lawyer and respected figure, 
was the prime defendant and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Despite his unlawful incarceration, 
Husák remained a committed communist - indeed he was to be the party’s First Secretary from April 
1969 to December 1987. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, Husák steadfastly maintained his 
innocence, bombarding the authorities with letters and petitions demanding his release and 
rehabilitation. The former was granted in the presidential amnesty of May 1960, but the Novotný 
leadership studiously refused to consider the latter until June 1963 when, in the wake of the Kolder 
report and with the Husák case becoming a burning and emotional national issue in Slovakia, the 
party set up the so-called ‘Barnabite Commission’ to investigate the accusation of ‘bourgeois 
nationalism’. Its conclusions were unexpected. The charge of ‘bourgeois nationalism’ was found to 
have no justification, full party rehabilitation was bestowed on Husák and his co-defendants in 
December 1963 and partly as a consequence of the commission’s fact-finding efforts the despised 
Slovak ‘centralist’, Široký, was removed as Prime Minister. The report remained silent, however, on 
pressing broader problems such as Slovakia’s perceived second-class economic, political and 
constitutional status.11 
    Ultimately, the three party review committees in 1955-57 (Barák) and 1962-63 (Kolder and 
‘Barnabite’) were all unsatisfactory compromise affairs designed to limit the impact of rehabilitation on 
the reputation of the incumbent leaders, notably Novotný, and of the KSČ and regime as a whole. But 
in our opinion, cynical opportunism, careerism, guilt and deep-rooted fear were not the only factors 
that constrained the commissions’ work. It would appear that many communists, particularly in the 
elite, genuinely believed in the guilt, or at least complicity, of some of the main victims of Stalinist 
terror. It was almost impossible for diehard militants to admit that the party - the repository of 
‘historical truth’, progress and enlightenment - had got things wrong. This ideologically conditioned, 
essentially ‘Stalinist’, mentality played a crucial role in hindering a full and open post-mortem on the 
crimes of the 1948-54 period. Hence, it was precisely during the reformist and democratising, though 
short-lived, Prague Spring from January to August 1968 that the rehabilitation process entered a 
qualitatively different, more civilised, stage. The party Action Programme, ratified in early April 1968, 
gave the public a clear foretaste of the new spirit:  
The Party realizes that people unlawfully condemned and persecuted cannot regain the lost 
years of their life. It will, however, do its best to remove any shadow of the mistrust and 
humiliation to which families and relatives of those affected were often subjected, and will 
resolutely ensure that such persecuted people have every opportunity of showing their worth 
in work, in public life, and in political activities.12 
    To this end, a law on judicial rehabilitation (No. 82/1968) was passed almost unanimously by the 
National Assembly on 25 June 1968. It has been described as ‘a humane step, rare in history, and 
unique in the communist world, to restore justice to the victims of illegalities of an entire historical 
period’. It was proposed to re-examine the cases of up to 100,000 individuals unjustly sentenced in 
the years 1948 to 1965, to offer financial compensation to bona fide victims to a maximum of 20,000 
crowns per annum, and to permit, in certain circumstances, the criminal punishment of those guilty of 
illegal actions in the security and judicial services and in the relevant ministries.13 For the first time, 
judicial and social rehabilitation was to be extended to tens of thousands of non-communists, not just 
leading communists. However, the law did not fully satisfy everyone. Some organisations, like the 
newly-formed K-231, a large grouping of vocal ex-political prisoners, and the Union of Anti-Fascist 
Fighters, forcefully promoted the idea of a universal rehabilitation to include all those convicted of 
politically motivated ‘crimes’, to annul all sentences of the political trials and to compensate all 
victims.14 Communist bosses, even the most reformist, could not accept this sweeping demand and in 
the event the law exempted from rehabilitation those individuals who had been justly convicted of 
violating valid laws, such as those who distributed anti-communist leaflets or helped people to flee the 
state borders into West Germany or Austria. It was considered that these and other prosecutions 
were ‘derived from the historically justified class character of the legislation of the socialist 
revolution.’15 
   In tandem with the rehabilitation law, in April 1968 the Dubček leadership created a fourth party 
review committee - the Piller Commission - to re-investigate the major political trials of the early 
1950s, including that of Slánský and his accomplices, who were finally declared innocent victims and 
granted full party rehabilitation and exoneration. The commission’s exhaustive findings never saw the 
light of day in communist Czechoslovakia as they fell foul of the Soviet-led military invasion in August 
1968, but an abbreviated version did appear in English translation in 1971. Unlike its predecessors, 
the Piller report provided a comprehensive interpretation of the causes of Stalinist repression. It 
assigned prime responsibility to Klement Gottwald, KSČ chairman throughout the years of terror, and 
other high-ranking party officials, mentioning the now disgraced Novotný by name, and controversially 
discussed the often determining role played by Soviet advisers. The report concluded that ‘an 
instrument of power had come into being, accountable to no one, beyond all control and outside the 
law; it had placed itself above society and usurped a power to which it had no right. Its very existence 
was unconstitutional.’16 The tragedy is that such fine words were doubtless fifteen years too late for 
the victims of this monopolistic ‘instrument of power’. 
    Given the corrosive nature of the revitalised rehabilitation process in 1968, it is surprising that it 
was not immediately derailed by the Warsaw Pact invasion. In the year following the occupation, 
23,306 proposals for review were submitted by citizen-victims and the General Prosecutor’s Office 
(GPO) received approximately 7,000 complaints about violations of the law under the Stalinist regime. 
However, over the coming months the situation gradually hardened: K-231 was effectively banned, 
‘reformist’ leaders in the GPO, Supreme Court and the Ministries of Justice and Interior were purged, 
and the new ‘normalising’ party authorities, paradoxically soon to be headed by one of the main 
Stalinist victims, Husák, began to reject rehabilitation requests.17 But worse was to come. In July 
1970, the law on judicial rehabilitation (No. 70/1970) was passed which seriously complicated 
rehabilitation procedures: some former political prisoners were compelled to withdraw their 
applications, and those who insisted on taking their cases to court had virtually no chance of the 
decision going in their favour. To add insult to injury, the applicant often had to pay full court costs. 
What is more, several citizens who had been rehabilitated in 1968-69 had their decisions rescinded 
and were forced to return the compensation they had been granted.18 In a few instances, such as that 
of Oto Mádr, a Roman Catholic priest whose conviction as a ‘Vatican spy’ in 1951 had been judicially 
annulled in 1969, cases were reopened. He and his original co-defendants were retried in 1973 and 
sentenced to prison once again!19 The fifth, and final, party review committee was established in April 
1971 chaired by the arch-‘normaliser’, Josef Kempný. It flatly rejected the conclusions of the Piller 
report and basically turned the clock back to the conceptions of the Kolder Commission of 1963.20  
    Ultimate closure for ex-political prisoners had to wait until the collapse of the communist regime in 
late 1989. In April 1990, the Federal Assembly ratified Act No. 119/1990 under which judicial 
sentences from the Stalinist period and beyond were cancelled across the board and virtually all 
political prisoners were fully rehabilitated. The Czechoslovak state also agreed to compensate victims 
for time spent in detention and prison and to facilitate the return of confiscated properties.21 Most 
interesting, however, is the recent reconfiguration in the Czech Republic of the historical role of 
political prisoners. There has been an evident shift in their public and self-image from ‘victims’ to that 
of ‘anti-communist fighters’,22 and this politicisation of history and search for ‘heroes’ who opposed the 
‘totalitarian’ behemoth was reflected in Law No. 262/2011 from July 2011 which awarded proven 
‘participants’ in the resistance against communism a one-off payment of 100,000 Czech crowns 
(about £3,300).  
      
The May 1960 Amnesty: Party and Popular Opinion 
The question of how the party and public responded to the various investigations, partial 
rehabilitations and amnesties from the mid-1950s onwards is highly significant. The rehabilitation 
process as a whole represented a distinct double-edged sword for the communist authorities. On the 
one hand, it was a palpable risk for the conservative Novotný party leadership, creating turmoil, doubt 
and heretical ideas in the heads of lower-level functionaries and members. Indeed, the partial 
exposure of the brutalities of the not-so-distant Stalinist past played a crucial role in galvanising the 
search among party liberalisers and intellectuals for a more humane form of socialism which 
culminated in Novotný’s ouster and the subsequent reforms of the Prague Spring. The longing for the 
return of legal norms and an end to arbitrary rule did much to bind the majority of citizens to the 
largely intellectual reformist movement. But on the other, there is evidence that sections of the rank-
and-file and, more importantly, non-party citizenry at times identified with the goals and ideological 
suppositions of the regime. This dichotomy is confirmed by documents in the KSČ and Security 
Service archives on party moods and social attitudes. We start from the premise that popular 
sentiment towards the Czechoslovak state in the post-1948 period was rarely based on mega-
narratives such as ‘democracy versus totalitarianism’, ‘capitalism versus communism’ or ‘freedom 
versus oppression’, though these concepts and binaries are not absent in the sources we have 
consulted.23 Popular views were more often formed and re-formed in response to a plethora of daily 
events, decrees and actions, some of which were not directly political and on which there was a 
measure of common ground between state and society. The presidential amnesty of May 1960 is a 
case in point. Although the party and police archives contain many examples of ‘opposition’ to the 
regime, they also demonstrate that citizens shared certain values and beliefs with the authorities, 
sometimes based on class perspectives, localised issues and personality clashes, and sometimes on 
illiberal, even authoritarian impulses.  
    Ostensibly, top secret KSČ reports on responses to the piecemeal revisions and selective release 
of prisoners reflected the disciplined and supportive stance of party functionaries and activists. But a 
closer reading reveals that an ideological and political can of worms had been opened. Already in 
spring 1956 in the wake of Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ a whirlpool of doubts, vacillations and anger 
was undermining the credibility of the KSČ hierarchy. Lower-level party officials and rank-and-file 
members began asking many highly sensitive questions: ‘how should party members explain the 
violently forced confessions of the Slánský band’ and ‘what will happen to those who broke socialist 
legality’ in Czechoslovakia by carrying out ‘Gestapo methods’?24 One reply was that they ‘should be 
publicly exposed and punished’. Others demanded: ‘who is culpable for the tyranny’ and seemed to 
point the finger at Novotný and Bacílek, ‘who were the main accusers in the Slánský trial’.25 One party 
stalwart intoned: ‘today I cannot trust the CC [Central Committee]….there is chaos in the heads of 
communists.’26 Similar remarks were even made by employees and researchers in the KSČ’s Institute 
of History, a showcase propaganda organisation.27 The new requirement for an objective ‘truth’ struck 
at the very heart of the party’s claim to a monopoly of knowledge and doctrinal purity and hence must 
have been considered a dangerous heresy.  
    The ‘answers’ provided by the leadership to these unwelcome queries were clearly inadequate as 
seven years later, in April 1963 at the time of the Kolder report, the same issues were again troubling 
district officials and the rank-and-file: ‘How was it possible to commit such gross errors and breaches 
of socialist legality….Did the party leaders really not know of the incorrect investigation methods of 
the security organs’? What role did the present members of the Central Committee play in the early 
1950s and have they performed real self-criticism? Some speakers linked the ‘cult of personality’ and 
lack of inner-party democracy with contemporary economic problems in the country and called for 
broader improvements in KSČ policy.28 Among many party activists, especially veterans, their long-
standing commitment to Marxism-Leninism was shaken and they were forced to question the integrity 
of the security services, the ‘shield of the revolution’. All in all, party reactions in 1956 and 1963, 
especially at the district and municipal levels, were often critical of the bosses and the ‘cult of 
personality’ that surrounded them. Some even contended that ‘a class struggle exists today in the 
party. On the one side are the ordinary [prostí] workers, and on the other the top functionaries, the so-
called red aristocracy.’29 In this atmosphere, the KSČ elite had a tough time ensuring Leninist 
discipline in its ranks, which, together with other evidence from the 1950s and 1960s, suggests that 
the party was far from a monolithically united body. The plurality of views and relative breakdown of 
authority in the party challenges the still influential concept of ‘totalitarianism’, with its explicit 
emphasis on effective control ‘from above’ and fierce centralisation and implicit assumptions of a 
passive and cowed membership. 
    Indicative of the subterranean turmoil in the KSČ, especially among the cultural intelligentsia, was 
the on-going Czech-Slovak imbroglio. In 1964, the Security Services drew up a top secret ‘Information 
Report on the Situation in Slovakia’, which surveyed reactions to the rehabilitation of Husák and the 
other so-called ‘Slovak bourgeois nationalists’. The document painted an alarming picture of Slovak 
political life. Like all official files, great care is required in assessing its provenance and content, but 
the report strikes a chord in its depiction of Slovak nationalist sentiment. It stated that the Slovak 
intelligentsia, writers and other ‘cultural workers’ positively evaluated the rehabilitation of Husák and 
the ‘bourgeois nationalists’, supported their activities in the 1940s and 1950s and viewed their 
rehabilitation as a starting point for broader political changes. There were also demands for Husák’s 
return to responsible political functions in the Slovak Communist Party. But more disconcerting for the 
leadership in Prague were the suggestions that the entire Czech-Slovak relationship needed to be re-
examined, that there was ‘broad support’ for Slovak national emancipation and that Slovakia faced a 
renewal of religious life and church activity.30  
    Indeed, a federal solution was a long-standing goal of many Slovaks and was forcefully reiterated 
by the prominent historian Miloš Gosiorovský, whose pro-federalism memorandum of March 1963 
heavily influenced leading Slovak political and intellectual circles.31 Profoundly angered, Novotný 
responded by delivering an offensive anti-Slovak speech in the city of Košice in June which did much 
to inflame passions. What is more, it appears some Czechs equated Slovak proposals for a 
democratisation of mutual relations as a form of separatism - ‘the Slovaks wanted to break away’ 
(‘Slováci se chtěli odtrhnout’).32 The point is that these ‘nationalist’ aspirations did not remain confined 
to a small band of educated Slovak intellectuals in and outside the party - they resonated with many 
‘ordinary’ KSČ members and citizens. To this extent, the fear of the central authorities was that the 
release and full rehabilitation of the ‘bourgeois nationalists’ would boost notions of federalism, strain 
Czech-Slovak relations and represent, no less, a potential threat to the integrity and unity of the state. 
Certainly, the Czechoslovak secret police (Státní bezpečnost - StB) went to great lengths to monitor 
the activities of the former members of the wartime Slovak nationalist party and the perceived 
remnants of its armed wing, the Hlinka Guard. 
    A case study of the presidential amnesty of May 1960 also reveals that the regime had good cause 
for concern over the release of so many internees. Under the terms of the amnesty, 7,168 inmates 
were freed from detention, of whom 5,677 were political prisoners.33 According to the Deputy Minister 
of the Interior, over 3,800 were workers, farmers and ‘working members’ of the bourgeoisie, 2,620 
were kulaks and other ‘bourgeois’, and around 650 were ‘anti-social parasitic elements’.34 Returnees 
were effectively on probation, were debarred from public life and often denied appropriate 
employment, most being assigned menial jobs. When they were liberated they had to sign a 
document saying they would never speak about their experiences in prison or camp, although some 
did. Hence, in the opinion of one Czech specialist, the presidential decree created ‘a new category of 
“former persons” - the so-called “amnestants”.’35 The bulky security service reports on these 
amnestants clearly indicate that although the communist leaders had decided to set free several 
thousand Stalinist victims they still regarded them as ‘enemies’ whose activities had to be closely 
followed.36 Indeed, ‘the amnesty was officially considered a mere “interruption” of sentence, which 
was suspended provided that, usually for ten years, no other conviction for a “premeditated criminal 
act” came up.’37 The StB motto appeared to be: ‘once an enemy, always an enemy’, a tacit 
recognition that the years of detention had failed to ‘re-educate’ the prisoner.  
    In particular, the security services were highly suspicious of the attempts by returnees to restore 
their social and political relationships, both at home and abroad, acts which were perceived as 
attempts to organise ‘anti-state’ cabals. Police files are replete with reports that ex-prisoners were 
engaged in ‘hostile activities’, especially former priests in Slovakia, stigmatised as ‘reactionary 
Catholic fanatics’, banned sectarians such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, and ex-members of non-
communist opposition parties.38 These ‘enemy groups’, it can be assumed, were more often than not 
a few individuals reminiscing over a couple of beers, but according to one expert released prisoners 
did organise ‘regular secret meetings’ in order to maintain friendships and express their political 
solidarity.39 StB apprehensions, perhaps, were not entirely imaginary, although it should be noted that 
far from all returnees voiced undying opposition to the regime. Some intimated that they would work 
hard after release and would never again get involved in ‘anti-state activity’. Others remarked on the 
social and economic achievements made in the country since their arrest and incarceration. 
Remarkably, several ex-prisoners spoke positively about their experiences in the camps, saying they 
had been well treated and fed. One allegedly commented on his 'carefree life' in prison, and several 
others, who had office jobs in the camps, wished to return there to avoid hard manual or agricultural 
work. It was even reported that some earned more in the terrible Jáchymov uranium mines than in 
free labour after release. Many, on the other hand, were ill and broken and just wished to be left in 
peace with their families showing no interest in political affairs whatsoever.40 
    Nevertheless, the police found plenty of reasons to be vigilant. They were concerned about the 
returnees’ negative attitudes towards the work placements they had been assigned, which were 
generally unskilled manual or agricultural labour, were fearful that ex-prisoners would disseminate 
information about the dire conditions in the labour camps and, ultimately, that their anti-regime 
sentiments might infect local communities and even provoke a political ‘reversal’ (zvrat). For example, 
it was reported that one ‘amnestant’, Josef Maršálek, ‘hates the present regime and will hate it till he 
dies’, while another insisted that ‘it is an authoritarian regime in which people cannot decide their own 
fate.’ Imrich Karvaš complained that he had ‘lost his sight in a concentration camp’ after being ‘beaten 
about the head’ and sustaining ‘a broken skull’.41 The security services were likewise extremely 
anxious that ex-prisoners would flee the borders illegally and fifty had been re-arrested by 20 July for 
such attempts or for ‘incitement against the republic’.42 An official police report into the popular 
reception of the May 1960 amnesty summed up the authorities’ concerns: ‘vacillating elements’ 
among the released believe a ‘reversal’ is possible in the near future not only in Czechoslovakia, but 
also in other socialist states including the USSR. They point to ‘imaginary disagreements in the 
highest ranks of the [Soviet] party and government’ and the ‘supposed military superiority of the West’ 
and thus aim to break the ‘moral unity of the workers and their faith in the government’. They spread 
the ‘slanderous broadcasts of foreign radio stations’, like Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, 
and ‘operate a system of passive resistance’, assisted by ‘reactionary’ sectors of society.43 ‘The 
typical view of the amnestied was distrust and an overwhelmingly hostile attitude towards our 
[socialist] order.’44  
    Popular perceptions of the amnesty, as depicted in the Security Services archive, also gave the 
authorities cause for disquiet. Most citizens were made aware of the amnesty by announcements in 
the party daily Rudé právo (‘Red Right’) and the trade union newspaper Práce (‘Labour’), which 
represented it as a manifestation of ‘socialist humanism’, a sign of the moral strength and political 
vitality of the system.45 Although some seem to have regarded it in this official light, people of 
‘bourgeois origin’ were said to ‘trivialise’ the guilt of the returnees, churches provocatively offered 
thanksgiving services and believers considered the amnesty ‘an act influenced by God’ and saw no 
positive part played by the state. The remnant Sudeten-German minority took advantage of the 
concession to push for improvements in their conditions and there were several reports of ‘reactionary 
doctors’ writing supposedly false certificates for amnestied prisoners freeing them from unsuitable 
work.46 In some communities, especially in the rural areas of south Moravia, returnees were ‘heartily 
greeted by persons with negative attitudes’ to the regime.47 There were many acts of individual 
kindness and understanding shown to destitute amnestants, one female returnee, Květoslava 
Moravečková, recalling how a sympathetic shopkeeper would occasionally give her food for free, 
which made a real difference to a poor family, while others in her village behaved towards her as if 
she were still a criminal.48 It was not uncommon for citizens to write to relatives and friends abroad 
saying they should ‘come home’ under the terms of the amnesty. The result was that a total of 127 
people returned to Czechoslovakia from capitalist states, raising suspicions among the ever-vigilant 
secret police that former émigré ‘spies’ had found their way back into the country.49 To this extent, the 
amnesty had potentially dangerous implications and citizens’ responses to it were unpredictable and 
uncontrollable. 
    However, despite the problematic unintended outcomes of the amnesty the archival sources do not 
permit us to conclude, as convention would have it, that the majority of Czechoslovaks were 
unequivocally opposed to the regime, or were budding ‘dissidents’. The contours of popular opinion 
were far more complex than the stark binary opposites of ‘for’ or ‘against’ the system. Our research on 
social responses to the Czechoslovak communist regime in the 1950s and early 1960s strongly 
suggests that there existed certain common bonds, or ‘bridges’, linking state and society, and that the 
boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ were not always as sharp as some scholars have insisted.50 We 
contend that the best way of conceiving of citizens’ reactions to the regime is one of ‘critical loyalty’. It 
is a notion closely related to that of ‘grudging loyalty’ or ‘loyal reluctance’ (loyale Widerwilligkeit) put 
forward by East German and Third Reich specialists, but which seem to us to be rather restrictive in 
their assumption of a basic unwillingness or reticence on the part of citizens, as if their ‘loyalty’ was 
wrung out of them.51 ‘Critical loyalty’, by comparison, offers the perspective of both positive and 
negative criticism, constructive, subversive and intermediate stances, and hence denotes more open-
ended social attitudes towards the political authorities.  
    We have identified two main overlapping ‘bridges’ of ‘tacit consensus’ between the party-state and 
society in the wake of the May 1960 amnesty: first, a shared ‘class’ or ‘workerist’ perspective, which 
was at times directed against named ‘class’ antagonists at the local or even residential level, and, 
second, what might be termed a populist illiberal sentiment.52 The Security Services archive is full of 
examples of class tensions and suspicions, which, although appearing as ostensible criticism of the 
amnesty, are better construed as sources of underlying affinity between diverse sectors of society and 
the communist regime. To be sure, the police documentation is exaggerated, over-ideologised and 
self-aggrandising, but it does impart a revealing, and we think largely persuasive, glimpse into the 
social resentments and cleavages that bubbled away below the surface of daily life. For instance, in a 
Prague paper mill employees openly grumbled that workers remain in prison while the ‘gentlemen 
factory owners’ (páni fabrikanti) and their supporters are released.53 Similarly, citizens in Ústí nad 
Orlicí disagreed with the amnesty, saying a worker who steals 2,000 crowns of property from the 
socialist state has to serve his entire sentence, while ‘enemies’ are released for ‘anti-state crimes’. 
They intended to seek an explanation for this from the party’s District Committee.54 In the Kolín 
chemical works, it was stated that ‘mainly workers should be released….not members of anti-state 
groups’ while at the Tatra factory in Česká Lípa there was ‘sharp criticism’ about the fact that ‘workers 
remained in prison, while class enemies were set free.’55 A worker in Klatovy posed the rhetorical 
question: if the amnestants came to power in Czechoslovakia would they release the communists?56 
A Slovak editor said it was a pity that ‘out-and-out fascists, bloody [Hlinka] guardists, people who have 
blood on their hands, people who have murdered and killed’ have been included in the amnesty. 
‘They will now poison our political life.’57  
    Individual ‘class aliens’ were also targeted. In Beroun district, local people opposed the 
reappointment of a Catholic priest to ‘spiritual service’ as ‘he belongs down the mines.’58 ‘Progressive 
citizens’ in Prague demanded that the amnestant Antonín Švehla, son of the pre-war Agrarian Prime 
Minister, should be ‘moved out of his country estate’.59 In the Moravian city of Olomouc, one returnee, 
Jaroslav Talášek, was ‘not popular’ in his community because of his ‘haughty behaviour and manner’ 
as an ex-general in the Czechoslovak army.60 Citizens in Třeboň criticised the release of a notary who 
had ‘robbed the people’ and in Prague a released prisoner, who had been given a post in his former 
research institute, was reallocated a manual job in a building components factory after his co-
employees and co-residents complained to the party District Committee.61 The ‘majority of inhabitants’ 
of Nořice were discontent about an anti-communist teacher getting his old job back in the local school, 
presumably because he would influence their children.62 In the Česká Lípa district, ‘citizens were 
seriously agitated by the return of Josef Kulhánek, a down-right agent of CIC [the US Army’s Counter 
Intelligence Corps] and leader of an anti-state group.’63  
    There was almost a biological reaction on the part of some citizens. Residents in Havlíčkův Brod, 
doubting that prison was fulfilling its ‘re-educative mission’, proposed that all returnees should be 
removed to another housing estate as if they were blighted by disease. One local family had four 
amnestants, one of whom was ‘well known as a foreign intelligence agent’, and their return ‘would 
mean nothing good for the community’, especially as they had many relatives on the estate.64 In 
eastern Bohemia, there were ‘disturbances’ among local workers against a certain Dočekal, a former 
band-master who had been imprisoned for eight years for hiding two ‘anti-state criminals’ in his home. 
Citizens disagreed ‘on principle’ with his amnesty and ‘workers want to submit a protest to the central 
organs’. Likewise, an amnestied former manufacturer said that he had come back from a 
‘concentration camp’, a contentious term which aroused disdain among local workers, who insisted 
that only those who had been ‘re-educated’ in prison should be released.65  
    Much of the archival record is also permeated by a distinct illiberalism often linked to a palpable 
sense of social injustice, even a measure of irrational envy. This very human sentiment, however, was 
generally couched in officially sanctioned rhetoric in order to provide an ideological alibi for the 
speaker or complainant. For example, citizens in Prague’s 11th district ‘protested’ about the fact that 
some amnestants had been provided with accommodation without having to take their turn on the 
housing list, and a similar grumble occurred in Křivoklát.66 Workers in central Bohemia lamented that 
returnees were being re-awarded their academic titles, civil and voting rights, and were even granted 
paid holidays. Inhabitants of the 'entire Chrudim district’ were concerned that the crimes of the 
returnees were ‘forgiven’ and that they could lay claim to pensions. In addition, in one local 
community ‘citizens disagreed with the release of the majority of amnestied persons’, saying their time 
in prison was too short to re-educate them. They were ‘outright enemies of the system’, who 
immediately after their discharge ‘walked provocatively around’ the village. In the Beroun area, one 
resident complained that the ‘amnesty had released all the scum (lumpové)’ and in the Mělník district 
citizens bemoaned the release of one prisoner because he had been given a twelve year sentence, 
but had only served two. A Slovak editor intimated that many of his fellow citizens may not have 
shared his positive attitude to the amnesty: ‘At last they’ve released completely innocent people. But 
only those who they haven’t killed. And many would have preferred it if they had killed them.’67 In the 
north Bohemian region, it was even reported that in general ‘ordinary workers’ were of the ‘firm 
opinion’ that the ‘scale of the amnesty was too democratic’ and the liberation of ‘hardened anti-state 
elements’ would not ‘pay off’, as seen in Hungary and Poland in 1956.68 
    What do the tortuous rehabilitation process and the multifarious reactions to it tell us about the 
Czechoslovak party and state-society relations in the 1950s and 1960s? The problematic and 
fragmentary nature of party and secret police archives do not permit any sweeping generalisations 
and thus all conclusions must be circumspect. That said, three broad assessments can be put 
forward. First, the release of political prisoners and the exposure of Stalinist crimes threatened a 
deep-seated fracture in party discipline, which potentially struck at the heart of communist authority 
and to a certain extent laid bare the fragilities of the regime as a whole. This was particularly so in 
regard to Slovak nationalism and the highly sensitive issue of Czech-Slovak mutual relations. This 
must at least in part explain why KSČ dignitaries throughout the 1950s and 1960s were so reluctant to 
judicially and politically rehabilitate Stalinist victims. It wasn’t simply the case that incumbent leaders 
feared for their own positions - they feared, implicitly if not explicitly, for the regime and state per se.  
    Second, the multidimensional popular responses to the 1960 amnesty suggest that the axiomatic 
Cold War stereotype of a presumed gulf between ‘us’ and ‘them’ - the ‘good’ people versus the ‘evil’ 
state - is overly simplistic. While many citizens did indeed use the occasion of the amnesty to vent 
their opposition to the existing order, many others adopted a position of ‘critical loyalty’ to the goals 
and visions of the communist regime and appropriated and reformulated aspects of the official 
ideology in line with their daily experiences and personal views. This intermediate and constantly 
shifting nexus was based on a set of shared values and perceptions, or ‘bridges’ as we described 
them, some of which were short-term and provisional, others longer-term and more permanent, some 
ideological, others practical, some more embedded, others contingent on rapidly changing 
circumstances. To the extent that popular opinion showed distinct strains of illiberalism, 
authoritarianism, even forms of neo-Stalinism, the much-vaunted notion of Czech ‘humanist 
democratic’ political culture needs to be contested. In this sense, the varying shades of public reaction 
to rehabilitation force us to re-examine our preconceived notions of social norms and beliefs. Just as 
important, they reveal that fundamental communist ideological assumptions on class divisions, 
hostility towards 'enemies' and the 'superiority' of the working class appear to have influenced fairly 
broad social strata. However, one vital issue - the differing attitudes of Czechs and Slovaks - must 
await its researcher. Conventional wisdom would have it that ‘pro-socialist’ sentiment was stronger 
among the former than the latter, but opinion polls in post-communist Slovakia reveal that surprisingly 
high numbers of Slovaks looked back positively on the achievements of the period 1948-89.69 
    Finally, and more tentatively, the experience of amnesty and rehabilitation may tell us something 
new about the Prague Spring. Hitherto, the origins of 1968 are routinely interpreted as essentially an 
inner-party power struggle between the ‘reformers’ and the ‘hard-liners’: Dubček versus Novotný. But 
there was also a very direct input ‘from below’ that had been rumbling away under the surface for 
many years: rank-and-file party members and lower-level functionaries, ex-prisoners and their 
families, members of the intelligentsia, and we suspect many ‘ordinary’ citizens had been pushing for 
redress and political reform since at least 1956 and the revelations of Stalinist illegalities and the 
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